Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs Doctrine by Dodson, Robert D.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 51 Issue 2 Article 4 
Winter 2000 
Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special 
Needs Doctrine 
Robert D. Dodson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dodson, Robert D. (2000) "Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs 
Doctrine," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 51 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
TEN YEARS OF RANDOMIZED JURISPRUDENCE:
AMENDING THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
ROBERT D. DODSON*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 258
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE 262
III. CHANGING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" LANDSCAPE: CHANDLER V.
MILLER ............................................. 269
IV. RETHINKING THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE ...................... 278
A. Weighing the Public's Interest in Privacy-Adding Weight to
a Person's Privacy Interest ......................... 282
B. Defining Special Needs-The Court's Critical Omission .. 284
C. The Exclusionary Rule and the Special Needs Doctrine ... 285
V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 288
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.'
The Court has generally interpreted this language to require that any search or
seizure be supported by probable cause and a warrant.2 Throughout the years,
however, the Court has carved out numerous exceptions to the warrant and
* B.A. Wofford College (magna cum laude); J.D. Tulane University School of Law (cum
laude). Associate, Barnes, Alford, Stork & Johnson, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina. The
views expressed in this Article are those of the author and are not necessarily shared by any
member of Barnes, Alford, Stork & Johnson, L.L.P.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (holding warrantless
search of suspect's home invalid).
258
1
Dodson: Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
AMENDING THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
probable cause requirements.3 One of the most striking and sweeping
exceptions is the "special needs" doctrine.
The special needs doctrine allows the state to dispense with the normal
warrant and probable cause requirements when two conditions are satisfied.4
First, the state must show it has some "special need" or governmental interest
beyond normal law enforcement activities that make the search or seizure
necessary.' Second, the state must show that its interest cannot be achieved or
would be frustrated if a court imposed normal warrant and probable cause
requirements.6 If the state satisfies these two conditions, the court engages in
an independent analysis balancing the state's interest against individual privacy
interests.7 Only if the court is satisfied that the state's interest in the search or
seizure outweighs the individual's privacy interest will it uphold the search and
dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements!
The special needs doctrine is a recent development and had its origin in the
school-search cases of the mid-1980s. 9 Initially, the Courtjustifiedthe doctrine
by reasoning that schoolchildren have a diminished expectation of privacy
while at school."0
The Court's early use of the special needs doctrine did not have the
sweeping effect that it does today." While the early cases invoking the special
needs doctrine allowed searches and seizures without probable cause or a
warrant, in each case there was individualized suspicion to believe aperson had
3. See Elise Bjorkan Clare et al., Project, Twenty-fifth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts ofAppeals: 1994-1995,84 GEO.L.J. 641,
743 (1996). The authors list several categories of exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. These include investigatory detentions, warrantless
arrests, searches incident to arrest, the plain view doctrine, exigent circumstances, consent
searches, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches, border searches, searches at
sea, administrative searches, and the special needs searches. Id. at 743-820; see also Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH.L.REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (listing
several exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
4. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
The Court stated that "our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a wan-ant ..... Id. (citation omitted).
5. See id. at 666.
6. See id. at 665-66.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., id. at666-67, 677 (holding that in this case, the government demonstrated
such a compelling interest).
9. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (stating that "the
accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence
to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause").
10. See id. at 338-39.
11. Compare id. at 347 (holding single search of schoolchild for cigarettes was
constitutional) with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (upholding
randomized drug testing of student athletes without individualized suspicion).
20003
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violated the law. 2 Moreover, the Court's early special needs cases focused on
individual litigants and did not deal with large groups subject to random
searches and seizures.'
3
By the end of the 1980s, the focus of the special needs doctrine began to
change. In 1989 the Court decided National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab4 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.'5 Von Raab and
Skinner radically expanded the special needs doctrine. These cases involved
randomized drug tests of federal Customs agents and railway workers. 6 The
Court expanded the special needs doctrine to allow this testing even when there
was no individualized suspicion to believe that particular employees were using
drugs.17 The Court justified the expansion of the special needs doctrine
textually by focusing on the "unreasonable search and seizure" language of the
Fourth Amendment.' The Court concluded that there must be some showing
that a search or seizure is "unreasonable"' 9 before the probable cause and
warrant requirements are triggered.
Following Von Raab and Skinner, different government agencies adopted
randomized drug-testing procedures. Lower courts were flooded with Fourth
Amendment challenges to such procedures.20 The vast majority of cases upheld
these testing programs.2'
12. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (upholding search of
probationer's home based on informant's tip that the home contained contraband); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (holding search of public employee's office based on
suspicion ofimproprietymustbejudgedby the reasonableness standard); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at347
(upholding search of student for marijuana based upon the presence of rolling papers during a
cigarette search).
13. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870; O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 712; TL.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
14. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
15. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
16. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-63; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 611.
17. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
18. Id. at613-14.
19. Id. at 618-24.
20. See infra note 21.
21. See, e.g., Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866,880 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding required
drug test of resident doctor not based on individualized suspicion or a drug-testing program);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding
drug testing of federal prison guards); Carrelli v. Ginsburg, 956 F.2d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 1992)
(upholding testing of horse-racing trainer based on reasonable cause); AFGE Local 1533 v.
Cheney, 944 F.2d 503,509 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding drug test of civilians with military security
clearance); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th
Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing of commercial truck drivers); Tanks v. Greater Cleveland
Reg'l Transit Auth., 930 F.2d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing of GCRTA
employees after accident); Penny v. Kennedy, 915 F.2d 1065, 1066-68 (6th Cir. 1990)
(commenting on random drug testing of police and firefighters); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding drug testing
of gas pipeline employees); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451,457 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding
FAA regulation requiring drug testing of airline employees); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Bush, 891 F.2d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding drug testing of federal employees
in safety-sensitive positions); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
Vol. 51: 258
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In 1995 the Court revisited the special needs doctrine in the school search
context. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton2' upheld a school policy
requiring student athletes to submit to random drug tests.' While the Court
ultimately upheld the school's drug-testing policy, some of the Justices showed
reluctance to invoke the special needs doctrine.24 This reluctance manifested
itself again two years later in Chandler v. Miller.' Chandler invalidated a
Georgia law that required political candidates to take a drug test.26 The Court
reasoned that Georgia had no special governmental interest in testing political
candidates, and an eight-Justice majority refused to apply the special needs
doctrine.2
Despite the fact that the Court has addressed the special needs doctrine
several times in the last several years, it has not adequately defined what a
"special need" or "special governmental interest" is. Indeed, until recently the
Court had failed to provide any criteria that lower courts could use in
that drug testing of corrections officers was constitutional); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113,
115 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that drug testing of pipefitter at chemical weapons plant was
constitutional); English v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 938 F. Supp. 775, 783 (N.D. Ala.
1996) (upholding drug testing of school bus mechanic); Drake v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 387, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (commenting on drug testing of flight attendant pursuant to
FAA regulation); Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. Haw. 1995) (upholding tissue
sampling for DNA matching for members of the armed forces), vacated as moot, 109 F.3d 1423
(9th Cir. 1997); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 891 F. Supp. 993, 1002 (D. Del. 1995)
(upholding random drug tests of firefighters), vacated on other grounds, 139 F.3d 366 (3d Cir.
1998); Laverpool v. New York City Transit Auth., 835 F. Supp. 1440, 1456 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(upholding the drug testing of all employees that could affect public safety); Romaguera v.
Gegenheimer, 798 F. Supp. 1249, 1261 (E.D. La. 1992) (upholding random testing of certain
court employees, including those who drove vehicles or had access to evidence room); Plane v.
United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (upholding drug testing of hazardous
waste workers); Bailey v. City of Baytown, Tex., 781 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (S.D. Tex. 1991)
(upholding drug testing of employee who drove a motor vehicle for the city); Anonymous
Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402,418 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (upholding random HIV
testing of firemen); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1503
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (upholding drug testing of Veterans Affairs employees in some safety-sensitive
positions); National Treasury Employees Union v. Hallett, 776 F. Supp. 680, 682 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (upholding a program of drug testing for Customs agents); Kemp v. Claiborne County
Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362,1369 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (upholding drug testing ofhospital employee);
Holloman v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 741 F. Supp. 677, 687 (N.D. Ohio 1990)
(finding that drug testing of citybus drivers was constitutional); Burka v. New York City Transit
Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation for
random drug testing or drug testing with suspicion for some Transit Authority employees);
Moxley v. Regional Transit Servs., 722 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that drug
testing of bus drivers was constitutional); Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (upholding random drug testing of police officers).
22. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
23. Id. at 665.
24. Id. at 666-67 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) and (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
26. Id. at 309.
27. Id. at 318.
2000]
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determining if the special needs doctrine applied. Additionally, the Court has
not explained how the special needs balancing test should be applied by lower
courts, and it has failed to consider all the relevant factors that should be
considered when balancing state interests against individual privacy interests.
Part II of this Article traces the development of the special needs doctrine.
Its focus is primarily on Supreme Court precedent, but also shows how the
Supreme Court cases have been interpreted by lower courts. Part III of this
Article critically examines the special needs doctrine as it currently stands in
light of Chandler v. Miller. I argue that while the outcome in Chandler is
correct, the Court's reasoning is flawed. Specifically, I criticize the Court's
definition of special need and argue that the Court's definition in Chandler is
confusing and inconsistent with earlier case law. I also suggest that the
balancing test used when a state has a special need heavily favors the state, and
I contend that the balancing test has become little more than a judicial stamp
of approval on randomized drug testing. In light of these problems, whether the
Court should have ever adopted the special needs doctrine is questionable. Part
IV of this Article considers the basic criticisms of the special needs doctrine,
but concludes that despite the doctrine's failings, none of the current Justices
on the Court support dispensing with the doctrine. Thus, Part IV also suggests
ways in which the Court could clarify and correct problems with the special
needs doctrine.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
The Court first recognized the special needs doctrine in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.28 T.L.O. was a student at a New Jersey public school when she was
caught smoking in the restroom. 29 A teacher at the school brought T.L.O. to the
school principal who searched her purse without a warrant.30 The search
uncovered cigarettes, marijuana, rolling paper, and other drug paraphernalia.3
Departing from its ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court
held that the principal's search was constitutional.32 The three Justice plurality
neither discussed whether the search was based on probable cause nor did it
concern itself with the fact that no warrant was issued. Instead, the Court
argued that because the student was in the custodial care of the state while at
school, it was not necessary for the principal to have a warrant before searching
her bag.33 Justice White, who authored the plurality opinion, reasoned that the
school had a special need in maintaining discipline and an environment
28. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
29. Id. at 328.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 333-48.
33. Id. at 341.
Vol. 51:258
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conducive to learning.34
For the Court, the issue was not whether a warrant had been issued.35
Rather, the Court focused on whether the search was "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment.36 To determine reasonableness the Court used a balancing
test.37 On one side of the scale, the Court considered the need public school
officials had in maintaining order in schools.38 In the Court's eyes this interest
was significant, and it would be severely burdened if a school official had to
obtain awarantbefore conducting a search.39 On the other side of the scale, the
Court considered T.L.O.'s privacy interest.' Justice White acknowledged that
the student had an expectation of privacy even though she was a minor in the
custodial care of apublic school.4 However, he argued thatherprivacy interest
was more limited in scope than an adult's expectation of privacy on the street.42
The Court concluded that the school's interest outweighed the student's limited
privacy interest and held that the principal's search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.43
The T.L.O. plurality opinion was significant because it marked the first
time the Court invoked the special needs doctrine outside a prison setting. The
Court did not discuss exactly what types of state interests were "special
interests" triggering the balancing test. Subsequent Supreme Court opinions
sought to clarify the doctrine.
Following T.L. 0. the Court began to apply a balancing test in other Fourth
Amendment cases involving searches outside of schools. 4 In O'Connor v.
Ortega the Court considered a claim by a doctor employed at a public hospital
who argued his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his office was
searched by a supervisor without a warrant.45 The hospital claimed that it had
a special interest because it was the doctor's employer.46 It argued this interest
outweighed the need for a warrant.47 The Court agreed with the state and
invoked the special needs balancing test.4 A four-Justice plurality led by
Justice O'Connor reasoned that a state employer had a significant interest in
34. Id. at 339.
35. Id. at 341-42.
36. Id. at 341-48.
37. Id. at 341.
38. Id. at 342-43.
39. Id. at 340.
40. Id. at 344-46.
41. Id. at 338.
42. Id. at 339.
43. Id. at 347-48.
44. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987).
45. 480 U.S. at 712-14.
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maintaining an organized, efficient work place.49 The Court found that the
doctor had a privacy interest in his office space, but concluded that the interest
was limited.5" The Court did not determine whether the search was reasonable
because the district court held no evidentiary hearing to ferret out the facts in
the case.' Nonetheless, the plurality made clear that the lack of a warrant did
not necessarily mean the search was unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional. 2
The plurality opinion in O'Connor made clear that the special needs
balancing approach could be used outside the public school context, but it left
unanswered questions. First, the plurality failed to define exactly what
constituted a special need sufficient to displace the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the plurality provided
little guidance on exactly how privacy interests were to be weighed against
governmental interests.
In Griffin v. Wisconsin3 the Court issued its first majority opinion invoking
the special needs balancing test. Griffin involved a search of a probationer's
home without the warrant or finding of exigent circumstances normally
required under the Fourth Amendment. 4 A Wisconsin administrative
regulation allowed probation officers to search probationers' homes without a
warrantprovided that there were "reasonable grounds" to believe that there was
contraband inside the home.'5 After learning that there "might be guns in
Griffin's apartment," probation officers went to his home to conduct a search. 6
The search uncovered a handgun, and Griffin was eventually charged and
convicted under a law that made it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a
firearm. 7 He challenged the search on the ground that it violated his Fourth
Amendment rights." In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Court found the search
reasonable under the special needs doctrine. 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, noted that Griffin had a constitutionally protected right to privacy in
his home.60 However, Justice Scalia believed that Wisconsin's probation
system, like a government office, prison, or school, gave the State a special
need beyond normal law enforcement activity.6' Specifically, the Court found
Wisconsin to have a significant interest in seeing that probationers follow
49. Id. at 718-19.
50. Id. at 719-21.
51. Id. at 726-27.
52. Id. at 727-29.
53. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
54. Id. at 870-72.
55. Id. at 870-71 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 871.
57. Id. at 871-72.
58. Id. at 872.
59. Id. at 880.
60. Id. at 873.
61. Id. at 873-75.
Vol. 51: 258
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probation terms.62 It argued that a warrant requirement would hamper the
probation program and was not necessary given the nature of the intrusion.63
The Court's opinion emphasized that the probation officer was not a police
officer. Instead, the law in question referred to probationers as "clients" of the
probation officer.' 4 The probation officers were directed to help clients through
"individualized counseling designed to foster growth and development.... ."6'
Arguing that Griffin was a "client," Justice Scalia reasoned that the search by
the probation officers was less intrusive than if it had been conducted by a
police officer.6 The Court also was not concerned with the fact that the
Wisconsin regulation dispensed with probable cause.67 In Justice Scalia's eyes,
a probable cause requirement would "unduly disrupt[]" the state's probation
program.6" The Court's opinion concluded by finding the search of Griffin's
home constitutional under the special needs doctrine despite the lack of a
warrant or probable cause.69
The case was significant because for the first time the Court hinted that the
special needs doctrine could be used to dispense with both the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court
did not completely eliminate the need for individual suspicion. The Wisconsin
regulation at issue in Griffin specifically required that there be "reasonable
grounds" for the search.7"
In two landmark cases the following year, the Court moved away from the
requirement of individualized suspicion. In both cases the Court upheld
randomized drug-testing programs using the special needs doctrine.7 ' In
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a random drug-testing program in the U.S. Customs
Service.72 The drug-testing program required Customs agents involved in the
interdiction and seizure of contraband and drugs to submit to drug testing.
7"
The policy was implemented because the Service feared that Customs agents
on duty could not adequately perform their duties and might pose a danger to
society if they used drugs.74 As in Griffin, a five-Justice majority decided that
the government's action was motivated by a special need beyond normal law
62. Id. at 875.
63. Id. at 876.
64. Id. (citation omitted).
65. Id. (alteration omitted).
66. Id. at 876-77.
67. Id. at 878.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 880.
70. Id. at 871 (citation omitted).
71. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
72. 489 U.S. at 659.
73. Id. at 660-61.
74. Id. at 661.
2000]
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enforcement efforts." Justice Kennedy's majority opinion emphasized the fact
that the employees subjected to drug testing were required by their positions to
carry firearms.76 The Court reasoned that Customs agents on drugs posed a
serious danger to the public, and thus the Customs Service had an interest in
ensuring public safety.77 The Court also noted that U.S. Customs was the first
line of defense in the war on drugs, and it found that the Customs Service had
an interest in ensuring that its employees remain drug free while fighting the
drug problem. 8
After concluding that the Customs Service had a special interest in its drug-
testing policy, the Court examined the interests at stake.79 It held the
government interest in ensuring a drug-free Customs Service was significant
given the potential safety concerns and sensitive nature of the work Customs
agents perform. 0 Justice Kennedy reasoned that while a drug test "could be
substantial," the operational realities of the work place gave employees at the
Customs Service a diminished expectation of privacy.8" Justice Kennedy
compared Customs agents with employees at the U.S. Mint or military
intelligence. Like these employees, Customs agents had more reason to expect
a limited amount of privacy than the general public. 2 While Customs agents
had a reasonable expectation to privacy, their privacy interest was not as
significant as an ordinary person on the street. 3 Given the nature of the
interests at stake, the Court concluded the Customs Service drug-testing policy
was reasonable despite the fact that tests were conducted without any
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives 'Ass 'n.5 Skinner dealt with federal regulations that required railroad
workers involved in major accidents to submit to drug and alcohol tests
following the accident.86 The regulations also authorized the randomized testing
of railroad employees involved in "safety-sensitive positions." 7 The regulation
was passed in response to several accidents that occurred over the years
because of drug and alcohol use. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the
Court.8 He argued that the safety-sensitive nature of railroad work gave the
75. Id. at 665.
76. Id. at 670.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 670-71.
80. Id. at 674.
81. Id. at 671-72.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 677.
85. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
86. Id. at 606-13 (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 630.
88. Id. at 606-08.
89. Id. at 606.
Vol. 51:258
9
Dodson: Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
AMENDING THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
government a special need in deterring drug and alcohol use to ensure public
safety.9" In balancing the interests of the government against the individual, the
Court found the government's interest compelling.9' It was well documented
that several accidents with fatalities had occurred because railway operators
were using drugs or alcohol on the job.92 In considering the nature of the
privacy invasion, Justice Kennedy argued that railway workers, like some other
federal employees, had diminished privacy expectations because of the nature
of their employment.93 The Court also determined that the tests were minimally
intrusive given the nature of the information the government sought.94 The
opinion also emphasized the fact that test results were used only by the
employer and had never been released to law enforcement for criminal
prosecution. 95 The Court concluded that the government's interest in ensuring
safe railroads outweighed any privacy concerns, and it upheld the regulations
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.96
Justice Scalia dissented in Von Raab, but joined the majority in Skinner.97
Justice Stevens joined Justice Scalia in both cases. 98 Justice Scalia's dissent in
Von Raab argued that the two cases should be distinguished.99 Justice Scalia
pointed out that the government in Von Raab never showed that drug use was
a particular problem among Customs agents.1°° According to the dissent in Von
Raab, the same was not true under the facts in Skinner.' The dissent also
stated that in Skinner the government produced overwhelming evidence
indicating that in fact drugs and alcohol had caused several fatal train accidents
over several years.'02 This was the critical difference in the cases for the
dissenting Justices.0 3 Justice Scalia argued that before the government should
be allowed to dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, it must demonstrate that the problem it is addressing is real
and not merely hypothetical.'
Von Raab and Skinner were significant for a number of reasons. Both cases
marked the first time a majority of the Court agreed on how the special needs
90. Id. at 620.
91. Id. at 633.
92. Id. at 607-08.
93. Id. at 627.
94. Id. at 625-27.
95. Id. at 623-24.
96. Id. at 633.
97. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 605.
98. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634
(Stevens, J., concurring).
99. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 681.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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doctrine shouldbe applied. While earlier cases used the doctrine, disagreements
existed among the Justices on exactly how the doctrine should apply. Von Raab
and Skinner settled these disputes and expanded the doctrine to encompass a
wide range of situations. Most importantly, the decisions negated the need for
the state to show any individualized suspicion when its interest outweighed an
individual's privacy interest.
Following Von Raab and Skinner, the Court did not invoke the special
needs doctrine until 1995. However, between 1989 and 1995 local, state, and
federal government agencies drastically expanded the use of randomized drug
tests. Lower courts were flooded with challenges to these testing programs.'
0 5
With only a few exceptions, lower courts upheld randomized drug-testing
programs using the special needs doctrine. 6 Even drug-testing programs that
had tenuous benefits to public safety were upheld by lower courts.0 7
Despite the fact that challenges to randomized drug testing were largely
unsuccessful, cases were still litigated. In 1995 the Supreme Court revisited the
special needs doctrine in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton."8 The drug-
testing program at issue required all student athletes to be tested for illegal
drugs by urinalysis prior to beginning the season."°9 Throughout the season
student athletes were subject to random drug tests."10 The District's policy was
adopted in response to a growing drug problem in the community and
disciplinary problems at various schools around the District."' James Acton,
a junior high student who was interested in trying out for the football team,
challenged the law claiming it violated his Fourth Amendment right of
privacy."12
The Court disagreed. ' 3 Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Scalia
stated that the pervasive problem of drug use by schoolchildren gave the
District a special interest beyond normal law enforcement activities."4 In
balancing the interest of the District against personal privacy interests, the
Court relied on its T.L.O. holding and reasoned that schoolchildren have a
diminished expectation of privacy." s Justice Scalia argued that the nature of
student athletics gave student athletes a lesser expectation of privacy than other
students.' 6 The Court noted that athletes dressed out together, took showers
together, and were subject to other conditions that afforded them little
105. See supra note 21.
106. Id.
107. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
108. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
109. Id. at 650.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 648-50.
112. Id. at 651.
113. Id. at 665.
114. Id. at 661.
115. Id. at 656-57.
116. Id. at 657.
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privacy."7 In the Court's view, these facts negated much of the intrusive nature
of a urinalysis." 8 Justice Scalia also took notice of the fact that drug test results
were not used to expel students or subject them to criminal prosecution." 9
Rather, a student that tested positive was sent to drug counseling and had the
opportunity to correct the drug problem before any disciplinary action was
taken.
20
The Court then went on to consider the District's interest in testing student
athletes for drugs.'2' The dangers of illegal drug use, particularly when used by
children, weighed heavily in favor of the District. " The Court also argued that
student athletes were often "role model[s]" for other students and the District
had a great interest in insuring that these role models were drug free."
Interestingly enough, the Court did not address the specifics of the drug-
testing policy when applied to junior high school athletes. While the Court
discussed a number of problems the District faced, those problems appeared
much more pervasive in the District's high schools. Indeed, the only evidence
of drug use by athletes was at a District high school.'24 Similar testimony about
drug use at the junior high was not heard. Apparently, the Court believed that
a problem at one school in the District warranted a District-wide drug-testing
policy applicable to all student athletes. Accordingly, the Court upheld the
School District's drug-testing program.'2'
Vernonia was significant for a number of reasons. It marked the first time
in six years that the Court had decided a case based on the special needs
doctrine. The Court reaffirmed its T.L.O. holding and ultimately upheld a drug-
testing policy with a considerably broader scope than that at issue in Von Raab
and Skinner. While the Court upheld the testing policy, Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence expressed concern with the breadth of the special needs
doctrine. 126 The three dissenting Justices likewise expressed concern that the
special needs doctrine had grown out of control.
127
Im. CHANGING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" LANDSCAPE: CHANDLER V. MILLER
In 1997 the Court revisited randomized drug testing and the special needs
doctrine in Chandler v. Miller. 2 Chandler made substantial changes to the
117. Id.
118. Id. at 658.
119. Id.
120. Id. at651.
121. Id. at 660-63.
122. Id. at 661-62.
123. Id. at 663.
124. The high school's football and wrestling coach testified that students were high
on drugs while at practice. Id. at 649.
125. Id. at 666.
126. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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special needs doctrine. Importantly, it marked the first time that the Court
struck down a law in which the state argued the special needs doctrine applied.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion showed concern with the breadth of the
special needs doctrine, and the Court's analysis tried to place meaningful limits
on the doctrine's ever-widening scope.
Chandler involved a Georgia statute that required candidates for various
state political offices to undergo drug testing thirty days prior to qualifying for
a nomination. 29 Three candidates challenged the law arguing that it was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 30 The district court denied the
candidates' motion for a temporary injunction and subsequently entered a final
order upholding the law.'3' A divided Eleventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the
law on the ground that it served special needs similar to those in Von Raab.'32
An eight-Justice majority of the Court reversed that holding, finding that
Georgia had no special need justifying a departure from the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
33
The Court's opinion limited the special needs doctrine in animportant way.
The Court emphasized that the government must show that a "concrete danger"
exists before the special needs doctrine can be invoked to dispense with the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 34 The
Chandler Court was concerned that nothing in the record indicated that there
had been any problem with political candidates using drugs. 131 Without
evidence of a pre-existing problem, the majority believed that there was simply
no "special need" sufficient to override the usual warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 36 In essence, the Court found that
Georgia's drug-testing scheme was directed at protecting an image rather than
combating any concrete problem.
37
By requiring the government to demonstrate an actual problem before
invoking the special needs doctrine, the Court appeared to adopt the rationale
in Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab. Justices Scalia and Stevens dissented
in Von Raab on the ground that the government did not demonstrate that drug
use among Customs agents had ever been a problem.3 Before these Justices
would invoke the special needs doctrine, they argued that the government must
prove that it is addressing an actual problem. Both Justices Scalia and Stevens
joined the majority in Skinner because they believed the government had
shown it was addressing an actual problem.
129. Id. at 309-10 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 310.
131. Id. at311.
132. Id.




137. Id. at 321-22.
138. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
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The impact of this requirement is significant and limits the use of the
special needs doctrine. It is not sufficient that the government demonstrate
some potential problem. It must demonstrate an actual problem or, at the very
least, the likelihood that any drug use could be catastrophic.
Nevertheless, the Chandler Court did not go so far as to overrule Von
Raab. Instead, the Court distinguished Von Raab on the ground that itinvolved
safety-sensitive positions.139 Justice Ginsburg argued that "Von Raab must be
read in its unique context."'"' 4 The majority opinion in Chandler noted that
Customs agents, unlike elected officials, spent most of their effort trying to
intercept illegal drugs before they entered the country. Therefore, it would be
dangerous for those individuals involved in intercepting drugs to themselves
be actively using drugs.141
The Court also attempted to limit the special needs balancing approach by
holding that it applies only when public safety is in jeopardy. 4 The Court
invalidated the Georgia statute precisely because the government failed to show
that drug-using political candidates posed any real danger to public safety. 43
However, this limitation raised more questions than it answered.
The Court tried to justify the public safety limitation by arguing that the
unifying theme in Von Raab, Skinner, and Vernonia was public safety. 44 The
Court concluded that "where ... public safety is not genuinely injeopardy, the
Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged.'
4
However, the Court's preoccupation withpublic safety and its demand that
the public safety be threatened in order to invoke the special needs doctrine is
odd. There is simply nothing "special" about state laws designed to promote
public safety. Generally applicable criminal laws, traffic laws, and numerous
rules and regulations promote public safety. Indeed, many laws have no utility
other than the fact that they promote public safety. If the term "special needs"
is to have any real meaning and provide guidance to lower courts, the Court
must do more than simply equate the term with public safety.
Moreover, defining the terms "special needs" or "special governmental
interest" by requiring that the public safety be threatened is misleading and
inconsistent with prior case law." The special needs doctrine had its origin in
a concern for student discipline at school, and the Court affirmed this holding
in Vernonia 47 It was only after the special needs doctrine was articulated in
these early cases that a majority of the Court applied the special needs doctrine
139. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 323.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 313-23.
145. Id. at 323.
146. See supra note 21.
147. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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in a public safety context. However, the Court never abandoned the plurality
opinion in T.L.O. 48 In fact, the Court emphasized the point in Vernonia by
holding that the special needs doctrine could be invoked by the state to
maintain discipline and order in public schools. 49 In Chandler Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion completely ignores O'Connor v. Ortega in which
the Court held that reasonableness applies to a warrantless search based on the
special needs doctrine. 5 That case simply had no bearing on public safety.
A closer review of the Court's later special needs cases also reveals
problems with equating special needs and public safety. In Skinner the Court
upheld regulations that required drug and alcohol testing of employees involved
in major railway accidents and authorized drug testing of employees that
violated safety regulations.' The regulations had some connection with public
safety, but had no effect until after an accident had already endangered public
safety. The Court tried to overcome this problem by arguing that the
regulations would have a deterrent effect on drug use, but as the dissent in
Skinner pointed out, if the threat of a fatal accident did not serve as a deterrent,
neither would the threat of a drug test.'52
Moreover, there is nothing unique or special about laws promoting public
safety by deterring dangerous behavior. Sanctions in the criminal law are
defended on the ground that they deter certain types of behavior. For example,
ticketing speeding motorists might well be defended on the ground that it deters
behavior dangerous to the public. If the regulations at issue in Skinner were
merely designed to deter drug use in order to promote safety, one might well
wonder what makes that regulation any different from a speed limit.
Public safety played little part in the Court's Vernonia decision. Vernonia
upheld a junior high drug-testing policy that required randomized testing of
junior high school athletes. 5 3 Justice Scalia's majority opinion showed more
concern with the disruption and lack of discipline resulting from drug use than
a concern for public safety. The only safety concerns cited by the Court
involved sports-related injuries caused by student athletes on drugs.5 4 A coach,
who believed drug use by athletes resulted in injuries during sports
participation, testified before the district court. The coach was from the local
high school and did not testify to drug use at the junior high school that James
Acton attended.' Additionally, while concern over student safety is certainly
a legitimate interest, drug-using student athletes pose no more ofapublic safety
problem than any other drug users.
148. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
149. ernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
150. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987).
151. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989).
152. Id. at 652-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see infra notes 170-74 and accompanying
text.
153. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
154. Id. at 663.
155. Id. at 649.
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Before Chandler lower courts had also invoked the special needs doctrine
in cases that had no relation to public safety. The district court decision in
Mayfield v. Dalton.6 provides an example. Mayfield involved a Department
of Defense program to collect DNA through blood and cell samples of service
members.'57 The samples were stored for seventy-five years and were to be
used only if a service member's remains could not be identified.'58 To aid
identification, DNA samples from a service member's remains could be
compared with the previously collected blood samples.5 9 The government did
not argue that the testing was designed to promote public safety. The district
court described the government's interest as a "need to account internally for
the fate of its service members and in ensuring the peace of mind of their next
of kin and dependents in time of war."' 6° The court ultimately upheld the
sampling on this ground, but never mentioned public safety.'
Similar reasoning was used by the Seventh Circuit in Dimeo v. Griffin.62
Dimeo involved a challenge to a regulation promulgated by the Illinois Racing
Board.'63 The regulation required that horse jockeys and other horse-race
participants submit to random drug tests.6' The Seventh Circuit upheld the
regulation. 6 Writing for the court, Judge Posner argued that Illinois had two
interests that went beyond normal law enforcement activities.!66 First, it had an
interest in the safety of the participants. 6 7 Second, the state had a financial
interest.16' The court explained its reasoning:
The Illinois Racing Board has a dual concern with the use of
illegal drugs by participants in horse races. First is a concern
with the personal safety of those participants, who might be
injured or killed in accidents that would not have occurredbut
for such use. Second is a financial concern. Illinois derives
tens of millions of dollars in tax revenues annually from
parimutuel betting. Those revenues would fall if betting
declined as a result of a belief by the public that the fairness
of the races was being impaired because jockeys and other
156. 901 F. Supp. 300 (D. Haw. 1995), vacated as moot, 109 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir.
1997).
157. Id. at 302.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 304.
161. Id.
162. 943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991).
163. Id. at 680-81.
164. Id. at 681-82.
165. Id. at 685.
166. Id. at 681.
167. Id. at 681-82.
168. Id. at 682.
2000]
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss2/4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
participants were using drugs."69
Nowhere in the court's opinion did it indicate the special needs doctrine was
limited to cases in which public safety might be threatened. In fact, prior to
Chandler v. Miller neither the Supreme Court nor any of the lower federal
courts limited the special needs doctrine to situations when public safety was
threatened.
Even more problematic is the fact that equating special need with public
safety provides no real limits on the types of cases that might fall under the
special needs doctrine. Any number oflaws would undoubtedlypromote public
safety while compromising the most basic Fourth Amendment rights. If police
were allowed to search anyone in a high-crime neighborhood without any
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, one might plausibly argue that such
a practice would reduce crime and have a positive impact on public safety.
Similarly, a law that required all citizens to undergo random drug testing might
well benefit public safety by reducing drug use and its attendant consequences,
such as violent crime. Yet it is doubtful that any court faced with such practices
would dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in favor of the special needs balancing approach. One problem
with the Court's Chandler170 opinion is that it fails to clarify which types of
public safety concerns constitute special needs triggering the balancing test.
More disturbing is the fact that the Court has never invalidated a law under
the special needs balancing test. The Court invalidated the Georgia drug-testing
law in Chandler only because Georgia had no special need that justified the
law.171 In the Court's words, "Georgia's requirement that candidates for state
office pass a drug test, we hold, does not fit within the closely guarded category
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches."'7' Because the Court
held that Georgia had no special need, it was not necessary for the Court to
balance Georgia's interest against individual privacy interests. Whenever the
Court has discovered a special need, however, it has upheld the law in question
by holding that the governmental interest outweighed the individual's right to
privacy. This special solicitude towards governmental interest is due in large
part to the subjective nature of the balancing test. Nothing in the Court's
balancing test provides anything concrete by which to measure state interest
and compare that interest with individual privacy interests. What the balancing
test amounts to is how the Justices feel about a particular law. Consider the
majority and dissenting opinions in Skinner.73 Both the majority and dissent
purported to apply the same balancing test, but each reached opposite
169. Id. at 681-82 (citation omitted).
170. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
171. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
172. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
173. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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conclusions.174 Justice Marshall's dissent attacked Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion on the ground that Justice Kennedy overvalued the government interest
and undervalued the individual privacy interests at stake.1 75 Justice Kennedy
agreed with the dissenting judge below on just how threatening drug use is in
operating trains.176 Neither Justice could point to any standard to justify his
belief. This is not surprising because the Court's guidance in applying the
doctrine has been remarkably spartan. In Von Raab Justice Kennedy described
the balancing test in a single sentence:
[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment
intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance
the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical
to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion
in the particular context.
77
Nothing in the Court's balancing test provides guidance to lower courts on
how the interests should be weighed. T.L.O. and Vernonia provide the most
detailed discussion using the special needs balancing approach. Unfortunately,
both cases dealt with the privacy interests of children while at school, and the
Court noted that children at school have only a limited privacy interest. Most
lower courts have been required to balance the interests of adults against the
state's interest.
The Court's other special needs cases also provide little guidance to lower
courts. The bulk of the Court's opinion in both Von Raab and Skinner is
devoted to justifying the special needs exception and showing that a special
need existed thus triggering the balancing approach. Once that balancing
approach is triggered, the Court gives only a limited discussion of the interests
at stake. Moreover, most of the Court's balancing in Von Raab and Skinner is
nothing more than restating the government need for randomized drug testing
in the first place.
171
Because the Court has never invalidated a law using the special needs
balancing test, it is unclear what privacy interests, if any, are sufficient to
outweigh a governmental interest. Therefore, lower courts have been extremely
reluctant to find in favor of individual privacy interests, even when the
government's interest is weak. The drug testing of horse jockeys in Dimeo v.
174. Id. at 619-34, 650-54.
175. Id. at 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 628.
177. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,665-66 (1989)
(citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-201).
178. See supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
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Griffin is a prime example.'79 In that case the Seventh Circuit justified a law
that subjected horse jockeys and others in the horse-racing industry to drug
testing. The primary basis for the law was a paternal need by the horse-racing
industry to protect riders. The other interest was a fear that jockeys on drugs
might lead to the demise of the industry, which could reduce public betting on
horse racing and cause a decline in the tax money collected.' 0 In making this
argument, the court assumes quite a lot. It assumes that without drug testing
jockeys will use drugs. It assumes that if this happens people will stop betting,
and tax revenues will decrease., One hardly needs to point out that such
assumptions are purely speculation, but even if such assumptions are correct,
does a government interest in taxes justify the special needs exception? If such
economic interests are sufficient to dispense with the warrant and probable
cause requirements, one might well ask why courts should even bother to
consider the individual privacy interests at stake.
A few courts seem to have done exactly that and have not bothered to
consider individual privacy interests before dispensing with the probable cause
and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1245 v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,"' the Ninth Circuit addressed a Nuclear Regulatory
Commission rule that required drag tests of employees at nuclear power
plants.1 2 The rule applied to all employees, including clerical workers,
warehouse employees, maintenance crews, and other employees whose duties
were such that they posed little danger to the public. 3 Nonetheless, the court
went into great detail describing how each employee could pose a potential
danger by distracting workers in safety-sensitive positions.' Nowhere in the
court's opinion did it mention the intrusive nature of drug tests or consider the
possibility that such an intrusion was not warranted given the tenuous nature
of the government's claim of danger. For the Ninth Circuit, it was enough that
some worker might possibly pose a safety danger.
In short, the special needs balancing test has become little more than a
judicial rubber stamp of approval for randomized drug-testing programs. The
balancing of governmental interests against individual privacy interests tilts so
heavily in favor of the state that the Court has never invalidated a law using the
special needs doctrine. An overwhelming majority of lower courts have
likewise upheld drug-testing programs using the special needs doctrine. In
addition, the Court's special needs jurisprudence is so vague about what
constitutes a special need or special government interest that courts are free to
pick and choose which problems in society are pervasive enough to warrant
179. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
180. Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 681-82 (1991).
181. 966 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992).
182. Id. at 523-24.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 526-27.
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abandonment of the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
Perhaps the most disturbing problem with the special needs doctrine is that
in some circumstances it has been used as a prosecutorial tool in the "war on
drugs." As the doctrine developed, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
special needs doctrine should be applied only when the state had a special need
"beyond the normal need for law enforcement."'' 8 In Von Raab the majority
specifically noted that the policy at issue provided: "Test results may not be
used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's
consent." '186 Cases following Skinner and Von Raab reaffirmed this essential
holding. 8 1 In Vernonia, for example, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
emphasized the fact that drug-test results obtained from student athletes were
not turned over to law enforcement or used for any internal disciplinary
function.' While the Court has never gone so far as to hold that test results
could not later be used in criminal prosecutions, the Court's rationale would
appear to provide meaningful limitations on the doctrine.
Unfortunately, this apparent limitation has been largely ignored.
Prosecutors have frequently used evidence obtained in searches justified by the
special needs doctrine in criminal prosecutions and juvenile delinquency
proceedings." 9 Even more troubling, most courts that have addressed the issue
have upheld the use of such evidence in criminal prosecutions and juvenile
185. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S., 656, 665 (1989);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
186. 489 U.S. at 666.
187. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
188. 515 U.S. at 658.
189. See, e.g., People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451-53 (Cal. 1998) (upholding search
of parolee based in part on special needs doctrine and allowing evidence obtained to be used in
subsequent prosecution); State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316,320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
evidence obtained during a random search of a public school student); State v. Roche, 681 A.2d
472,475 (Me. 1996) (upholding testing of all drivers involved in serious accidents and affirming
subsequent criminal conviction for manslaughter and OUI); In re Patrick Y., 723 A.2d 523,529
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (upholding delinquency conviction based on evidence obtained
during a search of all lockers in school after report of a weapon); Commonwealth v. Cass, 709
A.2d 350,365 (Pa. 1998) (upholding conviction for possession of marijuana based on drug-dog
search of lockers in a school); In re S.S., 680 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 1996) (upholding juvenile
delinquency conviction based on evidence obtained during a search of all students at a public
school); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1089 (Wash. 1993) (upholding testing of convicted
criminals in order to create DNA data bank for later law enforcement investigations); In re
Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Wis. 1997) (holding that trial court committed error in
excluding evidence obtained in a search ofa public school student after a report she was carrying
a weapon); State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 406 (Wis. 1993) (upholding drug and alcohol
testing of motorists under arrest for drunk driving when "clear indication" that blood will show
evidence of intoxication). But see Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 316 (Pa. 1992)
(holding testing of all drivers involved in serious accidents and admission of such evidence in
subsequent criminal prosecutions violated the Fourth Amendment).
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delinquency proceedings.'9o
While allowing the use of evidence obtained from special needs searches
is misguided and inconsistent with the Court's current formulation of the
special needs doctrine, much of the problem stems from the Court's own failure
to adequately define or explain the doctrine. In fact, the Court's early
jurisprudence lends support to decisions allowing evidence obtained from
special needs cases in criminal prosecution. Griffin v. Wisconsin specifically
upheld a criminal conviction based on evidence obtained from a search of a
probationer's home, which was justified based on the special needs doctrine.' 9 '
Moreover, as the dissenting Justices in Skinner noted, the fact that evidence had
not yet been used in the criminal context did not prevent the state from doing
so.'92 Today, the conflict and tension remains unresolved as the Court's most
recent cases on the special needs doctrine do little more than repeat and re-
emphasize the Court's inconsistent reasoning.
IV. RETHINKING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" DOCTRINE
Considerable doubt exists over whether the Court should have ever
adopted the special needs doctrine. The doctrine has come under fire from
scholars'93 and judges'94 alike. Perhaps the most eloquent opposition to the
special needs doctrine came from Justice Marshall's dissent in Skinner.
Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justice Brennan, called the majority's
reasoning "shameless," "shortsighted," "unprincipled," and "dangerous."' 95
Marshall stated that the government's random drug-testing procedure was a
190. See infra note 192.
191. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
192. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 651 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. R.v. 473 (1991); Kenneth C. Haas, The
Supreme Court Enters the "Jar Wars". Drug Testing, Public Employees, and the Fourth
Amendment, 94 DIcK. L. REV. 305 (1990); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale:
CreatingA Chasm in FourthAmendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. RV. 89 (1992); Gerald
S. Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law,
19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1992); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1991); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the
Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988); Phoebe Weaver Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique
and Analysis of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1990); James M.
Sokolowski, Note, GovernmentDrug Testing: A Question ofReasonableness, 43 VAND.L. REV.
1343 (1990).
194. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir. 1992) (Fernandez, J., concurring)
("This case ... demonstrates just how slippery the slippery slope we have stepped upon has
become. Perhaps because I have slid down that slope with the rest of the judiciary, I can and do
accept most of the reasoning contained in the majority opinion.").
195. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635-36, 641, 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"Draconian weapon" in the war on drugs.'96 Rhetoric aside, Justice Marshall
criticized the special needs doctrine along several lines.
First, Marshall argued that the text of the Fourth Amendment did not
support the majority's reading.'97 The Fourth Amendment states that "The right
of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... q98
According to Justice Marshall, the Court had always determined
reasonableness based on the probable cause and warrant clauses of the Fourth
Amendment.' However, the majority's reading of the Amendment stopped at
the word "violated."20 In essence, the dissent claimed that the Court had
dispensed with any kind of probable cause or warrant requirements in favor of
its own subjective notions of reasonableness.20'
Justice Marshall also pointed out that when the Court had previously
crafted exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements, it had
almost always required the government to have some level of individualized
suspicion justifying the search in question.20 2 While the Court had relied on the
special needs doctrine in previous cases, it had never used the doctrine to
dispense completely with some showing of individualized suspicion.2 3
Accordingly, the dissent claimed that the Court's total disregard for
individualized suspicion was manifestly unreasonable and unwarranted byboth
the text of the Fourth Amendment and the Court's own precedent.2 4
Second, Marshall suggested that the majority's willingness tojoin the fight
against drug use had led it to "join[] those shortsighted courts which have
allowed basic constitutional rights to fall prey to momentary emergencies."20
Justice Marshall did not question the government's need to deter drug use:
"The importance of ridding our society of such drugs is, by now, apparent to
all."2 6 However, he claimed that the Court should not relax constitutional
safeguards in an effort to solve some particular problem, no matter how
pervasive.20 7 Citing cases such as Schenck v. United States. and Korematsu
v. UnitedStates,209 Marshall claimed that the Court's greatest mistakes occurred
when it unquestionably accepted the government's solution to a pervasive
196. Id. at 635, 650.
197. Id. at 636-41.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
199. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 636-41.
202. Id. at 638.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 640-41.
205. Id. at 635.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
209. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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public problem.210
Finally, Justice Marshall argued that the balancing test used by the majority
tilted decisively against individual privacy.2 ' Marshall simply did not accept
the majority's claim that the searches and seizures at issue in Von Raab and
Skinner were "minimal. 2 2 Pricking a person's skin to draw blood or requiring
an individual to urinate under the "direct observation" of another person were
two of the most invasive intrusions of bodily integrity.23 Drawing on the
Court's precedent, Justice Marshall observed that in the past the Court had
called a search and seizure of a suspect's fingernails a "'severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security.' ' 2 14 Additionally, in Schmerber v.
California"'s the Court held that police must have an individualized suspicion
of drunk driving before drawing a person's blood for sobriety testing.
2 6
Marshall argued that itwas ironic to permitmultiple persons to have theirblood
tested without any individualized suspicion of drunkenness, while
simultaneously protecting a single person from precisely the same type of
bodily intrusion.217 The fact that the government had never used the drug-test
results in a criminal investigation meant little to Justice Marshall.2"' He argued
that nothing in the Court's opinion limited the use of the test results, and that
such results would likely be used in criminal investigations in the future.219 In
short, the dissent found the invasion of personal privacy much more pervasive
than the Skinner majority was willing to acknowledge."
The dissent also argued that the government's interest in randomized drug
testing was far less weighty than the majority claimed."' While Marshall did
not challenge the government's goal of deterring drug use,"2 he did question
whether the drug-testing policies at issue in Skinner would have a deterrent
effect.' Particularly, Marshall argued that if the fear of being involved in a
catastrophic train collision because of illegal drug use did not have a deterrent
effect, then the fear of being tested after the accident would provide little
additional incentive to remain drug free.2 4 Construing the interests at stake in
this light, the dissent concluded that the significant bodily invasion at issue
210. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 650.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 644-646.
214. Id. at 644 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,295 (1973)).
215. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
216. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 644-45.
217. Id. at 645.
218. Id. at 651.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 650-53.
221. Id. at 653-54.
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could not be outweighed by the government's interest.22
Justice Marshall was not alone in his criticism of the special needs
doctrine. Following Von Raab and Skinner, law reviews were littered with
scholarly articles critical of the court's expansion of the doctrine. Professor
Phyllis Bookspan, for example, declared in the pages of the Vanderbilt Law
Review that Skinner and Von Raab "epitomize[d] the continuing
dismemberment of the fourth amendment.'
226
The dissent in Skinner and the other criticisms by academics are well
founded. Since Von Raab and Skinner, lower courts have upheld a wide variety
of randomized drug-testing programs.' The lower courts hearing
constitutional challenges to randomized drug-testing programs have engaged
in little critical analysis in their rush to uphold such programs. There are
exceptions, but the vast majority of cases have added few teeth to the special
needs doctrine.
Nevertheless, in recent years the Court has shown no willingness to
abandonthe special needs doctrine altogether. The dissentinSkinnerby Justice
Marshall has gone largely unnoticed by the current Supreme Court Justices. In
the last four years the Court has revisited the special needs doctrine twice, but
no Justice has displayed an open willingness to overrule Von Raab or
Skinner.228 Based on current case law and the makeup of the Court, it is safe to
assume that the special needs doctrine is here to stay.
However, the current Justices have shown more willingness to revisit the
special needs doctrine and tighten the requirements necessary to dispense with
the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, the Court's latest case dealing with the special needs doctrine
required the government to show that an actual drug problem exists and that the
particular problem threatens public safety.'29 These requirements helped clarify
the meaning of special need, but did not go far enough. The Court never gave
a clear definition of special need, and it did not provide any criteria that lower
courts could use in trying to decipher if the government had a special need
beyond normal law enforcement. Additionally, as previously discussed, the
Court has never overturned a law when using the special needs balancing
approach. Chandler v. Miller overturned a Georgia drug-testing law because
it held Georgia had no special need,'20 but the Court did not reach this decision
because privacy interests outweighed Georgia's need for the test.
Consequently, it is difficult to determine what factors might be sufficient to tip
the scales in favor of individual privacy interests.
In what follows, I suggest factors that should be considered in weighing
225. Id. at 654.
226. See supra note 193.
227. See supra note 21.
228. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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individualprivacy interests. Specifically, I argue that courts should consider the
number of individuals subjected to a special needs search. I then suggest ways
the Court might clarify the meaning of special need and provide guidance to
lower courts about what types of governmental interests go beyond normal law
enforcement. Finally, I argue that test results obtained from drug tests justified
by the special needs doctrine be limited to the purported special need and
excluded from any criminal case.
A. Weighing the Public's Interest in Privacy: Adding Weight to a
Person's Privacy Interest
When considering the constitutionality of government drug-testing
programs, the Court has always weighed the individual privacy interest at stake
by looking to the invasive nature of the challenged test. Among the factors the
Court has considered have been the nature of test, the degree of privacy
afforded during the test, how the test results are used, and the group of citizens
to be tested. Unfortunately, the Court's analysis has been purely qualitative. It
has focused solely on the nature of the search and seizure by considering its
effect on a single individual. What the Court has neglected to include is any
quantitative analysis; it has not considered the number of individuals affected
by a particular drug-testing policy.
Something very deep and fundamental in our constitutional framework
suggests that the Court should consider just how many people the state plans
on testing or that might be tested under similar programs. This idea is embodied
in the language of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Amendment
provides that warrants shall describe with "particularity... the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."'" What I suggest is that
anytime our government makes a search or seizure, the search should be
limited to "particular" persons, places, or things whether a warrant is required
or not. When the scope of a government search or seizure becomes thousands
of people, it is difficult to think of our government as one with limited power.
Perhaps the point can be made clearer by examining some of the laws that
the lower courts have upheld under the special needs doctrine. Lower courts
have routinely upheld laws that require commercial truck drivers, bus drivers,
and the like to submit to randomized drug testing. 2 These laws have been
defended on the ground that they promote safety. Proponents point out that one
cannot safely drive these types of vehicles while under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, and they argue that the state has a special interest in promoting
public safety on the roads. Now consider a similar law with a much broader
scope. It is not inconceivable to think of a state passing a law that requires all
motorists to undergo drug testing. The same rationale could be applied to such
231. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
232. See supra note 21.
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a law. Drivers under the influence of drugs or alcohol cause thousands of traffic
fatalities each year. The state has a significant interest in maintaining safety on
its roads, which is sufficient to trigger the special needs balancing test.
Many things are troubling about the hypothetical law described above.
Among other problems with this hypothetical law is the sheer number of
individuals the state would test. The law described above would force the vast
majority of citizens to submit to a drug test. The very idea that a state could
require virtually every citizen to submit to an intrusive search and seizure of her
body is offensive to American constitutional notions of privacy.
At least some members of the Court may share this idea. In Vernonia
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence emphasized only one point: A school may test
student athletes who choose to participate in athletics, but the Court has never
decided that a school may test all students based solely on their attendance ."
Justice Ginsburg did not explain why such a search would be unconstitutional.
In fact, the concurrence was less than half a page long. 4 However, I suggest
that one of the factors troubling Justice Ginsburg was that such a large number
of citizens would be subjected to a search for no other reason than their
presence at school.
This was certainly one factor that troubled the dissenting Justices in
Vernonia.Y Justice O'Connor, who wasjoinedby Justices Stevens and Souter
in the dissent, began by noting that millions of students would be subject to a
search under the Court's holding.u6 The dissent wrote: "Blanket searches,
because they can involve 'thousands or millions' of searches 'pos[e] a greater
threat to liberty' than do suspicion-based ones, which 'affec[t] one person at a
time. '237
Despite these concerns a majority of the Court has never openly
acknowledged that the number of citizens to be tested should be weighed in the
Court's balance of governmental interest against individual privacy interests.
This is ironic given the fact that the Court has justified random drug testing on
the ground that it is in the public's interest. If the Court is willing to consider
the benefits to the public on one side of the balance, it should likewise consider
the number of citizens adversely affected because they are subject to such a
search.
I advocate that the Court balance the interests equally. Because the Court
has never considered the adverse effects on society from mass invasions of
privacy, a disproportionate number of cases have upheld random drug-testing
programs."8 If the special needs balancing test is to have any real meaning and
233. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 666 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 667.
237. Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted).
238. See supra note 21.
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provide any limits on government power to effectuate a search and seizure,
courts must take into account the number of individuals subjected to a search.
I am not suggesting the number of individuals tested should be the only
factor considered by courts or even that it should be the most important factor.
I am suggesting that to this point, courts have ignored this factor altogether.
This has given government lawyers a distinct advantage because they are able
to justify any drug-testing program by simply pointing to its supposed societal
benefits. But if the federal courts are serious about protecting constitutional
rights to privacy, as I assume they should be, then judges should consider every
relevant factor when balancing the interests involved in drug-testing programs.
The number of individuals subject to the test is a crucial factor that has been
ignored for too long.
B. Defining Special Needs: The Court's Critical Omission
The Court has never adequately defined what it means by special need. In
Chandler the Court suggested that special need could be equated with public
safety, and it explained that the special needs doctrine applies only when the
state passes a drug-testing procedure that might benefit public safety.239 1 have
argued the definition used by the Court is inadequate because it does not
explain several special needs cases in which safety was not at issue or the
benefit to public safety was very questionable.' °
However, even assuming that the Chandler Court meant to limit the special
needs doctrine to cases in which public safety is at issue, the doctrine is still
critically flawed. The biggest problem with the public safety limitation is that
it excludes very little at all. In Part III of this Article, I argued that defining the
special needs doctrine by equating special need with public safety puts few
limitations on a state's right to impose randomized drug testing on a large
percentage of the population.24 If the special needs doctrine is to remain a
viable part of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, then the Court
must provide more guidance about what kinds of safety concerns constitute
special needs.
One solution comes from case law in the lower courts. In Watson v.
Sexton24 the district court considered a New York City Department of
Sanitation regulation that required employees to submit to drug tests in certain
situations. Deborah Watson missed several days of work for no apparent
reason, and pursuant to its policy, the Department required her to take a drug
test.243 After some effort to comply, she ultimately refused to take a urinalysis
and was discharged by the Department. She filed suit claiming the requirement
239. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 146-69 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
242. 755 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
243. Id. at 585-86.
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that she submit to a drug test violated her Fourth Amendment rights.24 The
Department defended its discharge decision on individualized suspicion or,
alternatively, the special needs doctrine.24 It argued that while most of
Watson's duties didnotinvolve safety-sensitive activities, she was occasionally
required to drive a company vehicle. The Department claimed this task was
sufficient to warrant a special government need.2'
The district court rejected this reasoning. 7 Judge Mukasey found that
Watson's occasional obligation to drive a car did not make her any different
from the general public.2' The court did not deny that the state had a safety
interest, but the court simply believed that there was nothing "special" about
the government's safety interest.249 The court concluded that the state's interest
in ensuring safe driving was no more special concerning Watson than it was
concerning other citizens that operated motor vehicles.' 0
Implicit in the district court's reasoning is the idea that before a
governmental public-safety special need attaches, a government employee must
first pose a greater safety risk to the public than an ordinary citizen. What
makes the government's interest special is that the employee, by her
relationship and position within the government, may pose a greater safety risk
to the public than an ordinary citizen.
This approach has the advantage of limiting the special needs doctrine to
cases in which employees or other agents of the state have considerably more
influence over public safety than members of the general public. The doctrine
would still have application to employees such as police, firefighters, and other
state employees or agents who, by the nature of their relationship to the
government, pose a greater risk to public safety than ordinary citizens.
C. The Exclusionary Rule and the Special Needs Doctrine
The Court has held that the special needs doctrine may be used to dispense
with the normal warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment when the state has some special need beyond normal law
enforcement activity.Y Thus, the Supreme Court's very definition of special
needs emphasizes that the exception is applicable only when the state has some
244. Id. at 585.
245. Id. at 588.
246. Id. at 588-89.
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need that extends beyond enforcement of drug laws. 2 Unfortunately, this
repeated teaching has been lost on many judges that have upheld the use of
evidence obtained from special needs searches in criminal cases.53 If the
special needs doctrine is to remain a viable exception to the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, then courts should
allow evidence obtained from special needs searches to be used only to address
the special need that triggers the search. In short, I advocate an exclusionary
rule to the special needs doctrine whereby courts limit the use of evidence
obtained from a special needs search. This evidence ought to be allowed only
for that special need beyond normal law enforcement activity and should be
excluded from criminal prosecutions or juvenile delinquency proceedings.
An exclusionary rule finds support in both the Court's special needs cases
and the subsequent lower court cases upholding the doctrine. As early as 1989,
the Court emphasized that the constitutionality of the special needs exception
rests in part on its unavailability as a prosecutorial tool. For example, in
upholding drug testing of railway employees, the Skinner Court wrote: "The
FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of
employees, but rather 'to prevent accidents .... ."' 4 Likewise, in Von Raab the
Court upheld drug testing of Customs employees in part because Customs
could not turn the test results over to prosecutors without the employee's
consent2 5 In Vernonia Justice Scalia's majority opinion specifically
emphasized that drug test results obtained from student athletes were not used
for disciplinary purposes or in criminal prosecutions. 6 In 1997 the Court
again emphasized that the special needs doctrine ought to apply "[w]hen such
'special needs'-concerns other than crime detection-are alleged ....
Although the Court's opinion in Griffin v. Wisconsin 8 used the special
needs doctrine in the criminal context, that case was decided before the
doctrine was fully developed in Von Raab and Skinner. More importantly,
since Griffin was decided the Court has failed to use the special needs doctrine
252. See generally supra note 251.
253. See supra note 189.
254. 489 U.S. at 620-21 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 666. The Court wrote:
It is clear that the Customs Service's drug-testing
program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs
of law enforcement. Test results may not be used in
a criminal prosecution of the employee without the
employee's consent. The purposes of the program are
to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion
to sensitive positions within the Service and to
prevent the promotion of drug users to those
positions.
Id.
256. Id. at 658.
257. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (emphasis added).
258. 483 U.S. 866 (1987).
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in another criminal case." 9 In fact, in Chandler v. Miller,26 the Court's most
recent special needs case, the majority failed to even mention the Griffin
opinion.
Lower courts interpreting the special needs doctrine have recognized the
need to exclude evidence obtained under a special needs search in subsequent
criminal prosecutions." In State ex rel. J.G. the New Jersey Supreme Court
reviewed a state law that mandated testing of sexual assailants for HIV at the
victim's request. 262 That case involved a group of minors who allegedly forced
a mentally retarded ten-year-old to engage in certain sex acts.263 The New
Jersey court held that while the law passed constitutional muster under the
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, the blood samples obtained
from the alleged perpetrators could not be tested and used for identification
purposes in a subsequent criminal trial.2"
Similar reasoning was used by the Indiana Court of Appeals to overturn a
criminal conviction based on drug-test evidence obtained through the special
needs doctrine.265 Oman v. State involved a firefighter who was charged with
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance. 6 The
firefighter was tested after an accident pursuant to city ordinance. 267 The test
results showed that he was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the
accident.26' The trial court admitted the evidence based on the special needs
doctrine, but the court of appeals reversed.269 Relying on the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Skinner, Von Raab, and Chandler, the court of appeals held the
trial court erred in admitting the test results under the special needs doctrine.270
The court ofappeals emphasized that the special needs doctrine was improperly
applied in the context of criminal cases.27
Indeed, the Supreme Court's repeated holdings and rationale emphasize
this point.7 In case after case, the Court has repeatedly and consistently held
that the special needs doctrine applies when governmental interests extend
beyond mere law enforcement activities. Unfortunately, this point has been
missed by a number of lower courts.273 The result has been a perversion of the
259. See supra note 251.
260. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
261. See, e.g., Oman v. State, 707 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. J.G.,
701 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1997).
262. 701 A.2d at 1262.
263. Id. at 1263.
264. Id. at 1266.
265. Oman, 707 N.E.2d at 329.
266. Id. at 326-27.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 327.
269. Id. at 329.
270. Id. at 328-29.
271. Id.
272. See supra notes 185-88.
273. See supra note 189.
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doctrine. As the doctrine stands, states have been free to exploit the exception
by arguing that the absence of probable cause or a warrant is justified because
of special needs beyond mere law enforcement. But prosecutors have then
turned around to use evidence obtained by virtue of the special needs doctrine
precisely for criminal prosecutions. If the special needs doctrine is to remain
a viable exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, courts should limit this evidence by excluding it from subsequent
criminal prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The special needs doctrine is problematic. The Court has never defined
what a special need is, and it has provided no analytical framework for lower
courts to use in determining what types of drug tests or other searches and
seizures fall within the parameters of the special needs doctrine. Additionally,
the balancing test used when the Court invokes the special needs doctrine is
highly subjective. For over ten years, the Court has never invalidated a law
using this balance. Given the subjective nature of the balancing test and the
Court's reluctance to invalidate any law under this standard, the vast majority
of lower courts have upheld random drug tests and other searches and seizures
without requiring a warrant or individualized suspicion. The result has been
that millions of drug-free citizens have been subjected to bodily searches based
on nothing more than governmental policy choices.
If the Court is to maintain the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment, then it should afford greater protection to individual privacy
interests. First, courts should openly consider the number of people to be
searched by a drug test or other means. I have argued something deep and
fundamental in American jurisprudence cautions against massive searches of
the public. However, courts have largely ignored this concern in the special
needs context and have readily allowed random drug testing regardless of the
number people to be tested. Courts should no longer ignore the teachings of
generations past and should consider the number of individuals to be searched
before dispensing with the probable cause and warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, it is necessary for the Court to provide greater guidance to lower
courts as to when the special needs doctrine is applicable. To date, the Court
has never clearly defined what a special need is. The handful of Supreme Court
cases dealing with the issue have done little more than apply the special needs
doctrine by waving a magic wand and asserting that a special need exists. If the
special needs doctrine is to be a viable part the Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court should provide a better framework for its application.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly defined the special needs doctrine as
extending to cases where a government interest beyond law enforcement
activity justifies dispensing with the normal warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. If the Court means what it says,
Vol. 51:258
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evidence obtained in a special needs search and seizure ought to be limited to
the articulated special need. I therefore advocate excluding the use of such
evidence from subsequent criminal trials.
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